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(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-07-cv-00109)
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BEFORE:  McKEE and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges,
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  and
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OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Steven J. Ianuzzi appeals from a summary judgment entered by the
District Court in favor of the Commissioner of Social Security.  We will reverse and
remand.
I.  The Process
Following an evidentiary hearing, the ALJ issued a decision holding that Ianuzzi
was not “disabled” for purposes of Social Security disability insurance benefits and
3supplemental security income.  He concluded that the claimant had the residual functional
capacity to perform “medium” exertional level work and, in particular, to perform two of
his past jobs –  automobile sales representative (classified as light exertional work) and
credit manager (classified as sedentary exertional work) – as well as other light and
sedentary exertional level work.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567 Physical exertion
requirements.  The Appeals Council denied Ianuzzi’s request for review, and he
commenced this civil action in the District Court.
Ianuzzi insisted before the District Court that the ALJ’s decisions were not
supported by substantial evidence.  The District Court agreed with him that the finding
regarding the capacity to do medium exertional level work was not supported by
substantial evidence.  The Court granted summary judgment, however, because it found
substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion with respect to the capacity to
perform past employment and other light and sedentary exertional level work.
II.  The Evidence Regarding Debilitating Pain
and the Side Effects of Its Treatment
There was an extensive medical record before the ALJ.  A substantial segment of
that record dealt with the extent of Ianuzzi’s physical, exertional limitations.  His attack
on the Commissioner’s decision, however, focuses on the evidence of disabling pain and
the consequences of its treatment and, for present purposes, we will limit ourselves to that
evidence.
Following a motor vehicle accident, Ianuzzi sought help from his family physician,
4Dr. John F. Reinhardt, complaining of chronic and constant headache.  After an MRI and
other diagnostic work, Dr. Reinhardt diagnosed Ianuzzi as having whiplash, headaches
and degenerative joint disease and referred him to Dr. James Burke, a brain surgeon, for
pain management.  Upon examination, Dr. Burke noted that Ianuzzi had radiographic
evidence of degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine and appeared to be
symptomatic for occipital neuralgia.
Dr. Burke turned the pain management responsibilities over to Dr. John Johnson,
an anesthesiologist, on May 31, 2005.  Dr. Johnson was Ianuzzi’s treating, pain
management physician continually from that date through July 20, 2006, when he
submitted the report that is relevant here.  Dr. Johnson’s initial, primary diagnoses were: 
(1) bilateral occipital neuralgia; (2) myofascial pain; and (3) cervical and lumbar
radiculitis.  In the course of regular visits during this period, Dr. Johnson treated Ianuzzi
with trigger point injections, occipital nerve blocks, cervical epidural steroid injections,
and multiple medications.  These treatments produced short term relief, but the pain
thereafter returned to or near the original levels.
The District Court accurately described Dr. Johnson’s July 20, 2006, report as
follows:
In the report, Dr. Johnson indicates that he first saw Plaintiff on May 31,
2005 and that he last saw Plaintiff that day.  Dr. Johnson listed Plaintiff’s
impairments as “occipital headaches 2-3x’s day – pain radiates to shoulders,
back pain, neck pain.”  Dr. Johnson noted that Plaintiff’s then current
treatment included lumbar epidural steroid injections, cervical epidural
steroid injections, bilateral occipital nerve blocks, Percocet and Fentanyl
5patches,  and he described Plaintiff’s clinical findings as “tenderness in19
occipital regions bilaterally, tenderness along paraspinal musculature of
cervical spine and diffuse tenderness in lumbar spine region.”  Regarding
Plaintiff’s prognosis, the legible portion of Dr. Johnson’s response indicated
that Plaintiff’s pain would continue, and that his range of motion and
activities would continue to be decreased.
Fentanyl skin patches should only be used to control19
moderate to severe chronic (around the clock, long-lasting)
pain that cannot be controlled by the use of other pain
medications in people who are tolerant (used to the effects of
the medication) to narcotic pain medications because they
have taken this type of medication for at least one week. 
Fentanyl skin patches should not be used to treat mild pain,
short-term pain, pain after an operation or medical or dental
procedure, or pain that can be controlled by medication that is
taken as needed.  See www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo
(last visited 4/17/2008).
* * *
Dr. Johnson indicated that Plaintiff was markedly limited in activities of
daily living, social functioning, the ability to engage in sustained work and
the ability to deal with stress, but that he was unable to evaluate Plaintiff’s
deficiencies of concentration, episodes of decompensation in work or work-
like settings and ability to respond appropriately to co-workers, supervisors
or the public.
District Court Opinion at 16-17.
In the ALJ’s view, “Dr. Johnson placed severe limitations on the claimant’s ability
to perform mental work-related activities.”  Adm. Record at 18. 
Dr. Elizabeth Dunmore of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Disability Determination
performed a consultive examination of Ianuzzi on January 27, 2006.  She reported:
Since that time he has had problems with chronic migraines, neck and back
pain.  The back pain is the his [sic] most debilitating problem.  The pain
starts in his lower back and radiates into the legs.  He also experiences pain
6at the back of his neck.  The pain is constant.  It is 8/10 in severity. 
Percocet does help to take the edge off, but then he has problems with
drowsiness.  The pain is worse with the ambulation.  He is especially
bothered with steps.  The patient had worked as a sales manager for
automobile sales.  He discontinue[d] this work in mare [sic] [March] of
2006 because of pain, headaches and inability to concentrate.  He spends his
day resting in a dark room and taking medications.
* * *
IMPRESSION:
1.  Chronic pain syndrome.  The patient presents with a chronic pain
syndrome as outlined above.  He has severe subjective pain with minimal
objective findings.  The pain is chronic in nature and requires narcotic
medications.
Adm. Record at 363; Adm. Record at 365.
III.  Discussion
We agree with the District Court that the record does not contain substantial
evidence to support the conclusion that Ianuzzi has the residual functional capacity to do
medium exertional level work.  We also agree with the District Court that the ALJ stated
alternative grounds for the denial of benefits to Ianuzzi and that we could affirm that
denial if we found those grounds satisfactory.  Our problem is that while the ALJ stated
alternative grounds, he did so without satisfactorily addressing the substantial conflicting
evidence.  The controlling principle here is the one that we adopted in Moret v. Karn, 746
F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1984), from Professor Davis’s preeminent treatise:
Even if the evidence in the record, combined with the reviewing court’s
understanding of the law, is enough to support the order, the court may not
uphold the order unless it is sustainable on the agency’s findings and for the
7reasons stated by the agency.
Id. at 992 (quoting from K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 14:29 (1980).  While
we are not prepared to say that the ALJ or the Appeals Council could not state reasons
upon which the denial of benefits to Ianuzzi could be sustained, we find no reasoning in
the record that we can endorse.
Ianuzzi’s primary problem is chronic and substantial pain.  Every doctor who has
treated him has so concluded and has aggressively treated him for that problem.  Finding
no evidence to the contrary, we conclude from their diagnoses and the potency of their
prescribed treatments that all considered Ianuzzi’s pain problem to be a serious and
constant one.  Dr. Johnson, the treating physician who was responsible for the
management of his pain over a substantial period of time and, accordingly, was in the best
position to know, in the ALJ’s words, “placed severe limitations on the claimant’s ability
to perform mental work- related activities.”  Adm. Record at 18.
It was in this context that the ALJ, in finding Ianuzzi able to perform his prior
employment, failed to address in any way why these severe limitations were consistent
with his serving as an automobile sales representative and a credit manager.
Nor is a satisfactory explanation found elsewhere in the ALJ’s opinion.  The ALJ
did say that he gave “little weight” to Dr. Johnson’s assessment of Ianuzzi’s pain problem
because he was an “anesthesiologist” and “not a mental health specialist and his treatment
notes fail to document any mental health issues.”  The record does not support, however,
     The paragraph that follows this credibility observation states only the following in1
support:
On March 28, 2005, the physical therapist reported the claimant stated in
his initial interview that he had been in a motor vehicle accident in May,
2003, and had chronic back and cervical pain but did not complain of
headaches until “about one month ago. . . .”  The physical therapist reported
his initial examination disclosed SCM insertional pain at the mastoid
processes bilaterally (Exhibit 13F).  A patient’s report of pain upon such
palpitation is generally regarded as a sign that the patient has “extreme
sensitivity” or is falsely reporting.
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the notion that an anesthesiologist who practices pain management medicine is
unqualified to assess the impact of pain on his or her patient’s life activities.  Many
anesthesiologists do practice pain management medicine, and Ianuzzi was referred to Dr.
Johnson precisely for that reason.  While Dr. Johnson’s treatment notes may fail to
document any mental health issues, they most certainly document a serious pain issue.
This is not a case in which the ALJ determined that there was no medically
determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged
symptoms.  He expressly disavowed such a problem:
After considering the evidence of record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be
expected to produce the alleged symptoms, but that the claimant’s
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these
symptoms are not entirely credible.
Adm. Record at 17.  It thus seems apparent that the ALJ’s problem was not with the
medical evidence, but rather with the fact that he did not find Ianuzzi “entirely credible.” 
He fails to explain, however, what he found not credible and why.1
Adm. Record at 17.  This does not support a finding of “falsely reporting” on Ianuzzi’s
part.
9
IV.  Conclusion
We will reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand this matter to it
with instructions to return it to the Commissioner for further proceedings.  The
Commissioner may either grant Ianuzzi the benefits claimed or reconsider his application.
